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	<title>Comments on: If we have free will, does Mr Data?</title>
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	<link>http://explorations.chasrmartin.com/2007/03/24/if-we-have-free-will-does-mr-data/</link>
	<description>Believe nothing, no matter where you read it, or who said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your own common sense.</description>
	<pubDate>Wed, 07 Jan 2009 09:29:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Charlie</title>
		<link>http://explorations.chasrmartin.com/2007/03/24/if-we-have-free-will-does-mr-data/comment-page-1/#comment-9</link>
		<dc:creator>Charlie</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2007 01:03:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Well, yeah, but so what?  Einstein wasn't thrilled with probabilistic models of quantum mechanics, but they didn't stop worked because they were disturbing.

Is the question whether there is or is not "a soul", or whether or not there is something like "free will"?  I kinda thought this one article was about free will.

Cave's (and Adams') definition of "free will" seems to require such a degree of "freedom" as to form a straw man: so absurdly strong as to be vacuous, and one that implicitly presupposes that free will &lt;i&gt;requires&lt;/i&gt; a non-physical source for the freedom.

None the less, people sure &lt;i&gt;seem&lt;/i&gt; to be exhibiting free will, and the notion that the nervous activity required to move not being part of that will, but the thoughts about that motion being part of the will, is just Cartesian dualism in mechanistic drag.

So what if there is a physical explanation for apparent non-determinism, choice, and "free will" in an apparently deterministic system?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, yeah, but so what?  Einstein wasn&#8217;t thrilled with probabilistic models of quantum mechanics, but they didn&#8217;t stop worked because they were disturbing.</p>
<p>Is the question whether there is or is not &#8220;a soul&#8221;, or whether or not there is something like &#8220;free will&#8221;?  I kinda thought this one article was about free will.</p>
<p>Cave&#8217;s (and Adams&#8217;) definition of &#8220;free will&#8221; seems to require such a degree of &#8220;freedom&#8221; as to form a straw man: so absurdly strong as to be vacuous, and one that implicitly presupposes that free will <i>requires</i> a non-physical source for the freedom.</p>
<p>None the less, people sure <i>seem</i> to be exhibiting free will, and the notion that the nervous activity required to move not being part of that will, but the thoughts about that motion being part of the will, is just Cartesian dualism in mechanistic drag.</p>
<p>So what if there is a physical explanation for apparent non-determinism, choice, and &#8220;free will&#8221; in an apparently deterministic system?</p>
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		<title>By: Geoff Arnold</title>
		<link>http://explorations.chasrmartin.com/2007/03/24/if-we-have-free-will-does-mr-data/comment-page-1/#comment-8</link>
		<dc:creator>Geoff Arnold</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2007 00:46:27 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>All very fine and good, Charles. So why were the individuals studied by Libet and others so surprised (indeed angry) about these findings? The most plausible reason (which is confirmed by many other studies and surveys) is that most people are in fact good, old-fashioned Cartesian dualists. They believe that they have souls (spirits, purushas, etc.) that inhabit their bodies but are essentially independent of them. Furthermore this soul is seen as the source of individuality, including character, memory, emotion, volition, personality, etc.  This is seen clearly from the way that life after death is described, but also arises in such common beliefs as spritual possession, transmigration, out-of-body experiences, and so forth.

For the believer in souls, your "whole system" stance doesn't work. For them, the spirit proposes, the body disposes: the idea of preconcious body-based volition is incoherent.

Yet another instance of the &lt;a href="http://www.amazon.com/-/dp/0674929810" rel="nofollow"&gt;essentially counter-intuitive nature of science&lt;/a&gt;, eh?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>All very fine and good, Charles. So why were the individuals studied by Libet and others so surprised (indeed angry) about these findings? The most plausible reason (which is confirmed by many other studies and surveys) is that most people are in fact good, old-fashioned Cartesian dualists. They believe that they have souls (spirits, purushas, etc.) that inhabit their bodies but are essentially independent of them. Furthermore this soul is seen as the source of individuality, including character, memory, emotion, volition, personality, etc.  This is seen clearly from the way that life after death is described, but also arises in such common beliefs as spritual possession, transmigration, out-of-body experiences, and so forth.</p>
<p>For the believer in souls, your &#8220;whole system&#8221; stance doesn&#8217;t work. For them, the spirit proposes, the body disposes: the idea of preconcious body-based volition is incoherent.</p>
<p>Yet another instance of the <a href="http://www.amazon.com/-/dp/0674929810" rel="nofollow">essentially counter-intuitive nature of science</a>, eh?</p>
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